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Independent Law Firms that Practice Law Only:
Society's Need, the Legal Profession's Responsibility*
L. HAROLD LEVINSON**
Society needs an adequate number and variety of independent law firms,
and the legal profession has a responsibility to fulfill this need.'
By the term independent law firm, I mean one that comes close to having
all of the following attributes: (1) the firm's only business is the practice of law;
(2) the firm is owned exclusively by one or more lawyers who are engaged ac-
tively in the firm's practice (with narrow exceptions); (3) the firm requires its
lawyers to exercise independent professional judgment (or, if the firm consists of
one lawyer, that person exercises independent professional judgment); (4) the
firm does not have any significant financial involvement with any of its clients
other than cost reimbursements and fees payable in money; and (5) the firm
does not expect to receive a major percentage of its fees from any one client.
Many law firms, perhaps the majority, are now independent law firms as
the term is used here. Many lawyers, clients, and members of the general public
may indeed understand the term "law firm" to mean one that fits my descrip-
tion of an independent law firm. Recently, however, some law firms have volun-
tarily given up one or more attributes of independence and some segments of
the legal profession have advocated changes in the rules of conduct that would
permit even greater surrender of the independence of law firms. These develop-
ments compel us to face the possibility that independent law firms in the aggre-
gate may lose a significant part of their existing market share and social impact.
Society in general has not yet shown any great concern about the issue of
law firm independence. Without waiting for society to perceive the problem, the
legal profession should take action to assure the existence of an adequate num-
ber of independent law firms so that any client who wants to retain such a firm
will have an opportunity to do so.
I do not suggest that all law firms must be independent as the term is used
here, although society would be very well served if they were. I do suggest,
however, that all law firms meet at least two minimal standards of indepen-
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dence included in my proposed attributes: All partners in all law firms should be
lawyers2 and all law firms should allow their lawyers to exercise independent
professional judgment.'
Every lawyer-whether or not engaged in an independent practice-shares
the profession's responsibility to assure the existence of an adequate number
and variety of independent law firms that fully meet all of the proposed attrib-
utes of independence. By acting now, the legal profession can formulate solu-
tions that serve the interests of both society and the profession. If the profession
fails to take timely action, society will eventually perceive that the lack of inde-
pendent law firms presents a problem. Society will then take action, but its
solutions may not effectively meet its own needs or those of the legal profession.
The first step the legal profession can take to reach this objective is to
establish standardized attributes of independent law firms together with require-
ments for disclosure so that each firm will be clearly and publicly identified as
falling either inside or outside the category of independent law firms. The next
step is to inform the marketplace about the attributes, advantages, and disad-
vantages of the independent law firm. The informed marketplace, in conjunction
with appropriate regulatory action, should assure the survival of the indepen-
dent law firm.
This Essay discusses society's need for independent law firms, the attrib-
utes of this type of firm, and the manner in which the legal profession can make
sure society's need is satisfied. The Essay ends with a brief description of cur-
rent developments that have placed similar issues on the agendas of the public
accounting profession in this country and the legal profession in European coun-
tries, together with comments on the appropriate reaction of law firms in the
United States to the emergence of these issues in other professions and other
countries.
I. SOCIETY'S NEED FOR INDEPENDENT LAW FIRMS
Lawyers have much in common with members of other occupations. I will
comment briefly on some of these areas of similarity before addressing the one
feature that most significantly differentiates lawyers from members of other oc-
cupations. This feature gives society a special need for our independence, a need
that can best be satisfied if our profession includes an adequate number of inde-
pendent law firms.
2. This minimal standard is currently imposed by MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-
103(A), 5-107(C) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(b), 5.4(d) (1983); see infra notes
31-44 and accompanying text. My proposed attribute number two includes this minimal standard and in addition
requires the lawyer-owners to be engaged actively in the firm's practice, with narrow exceptions.
3. This minimal standard is currently implied by MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-
101 to 5-105, EC 5-1 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.8, 2.1, 5.1, 5.2 (1983). In
addition, courts in some states reinforce this minimal standard by providing a civil remedy for attorneys who are
discharged for exercising their independent professional judgment; see infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
According to my proposed attribute number three, the law firm should require its lawyers to exercise independent
professional judgment; under this minimal standard, however, the law firm should at least allow its members to
exercise such judgment.
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A. Similarities Between the Legal Profession and Other Occupations
Lawyers share many common features with members of other occupations.
For example, we are engaged in a type of business; we offer a unique service
which imposes on us a unique set of obligations; we generally protect the do-
main of our profession against encroachments by members of other occupations
while we occasionally try to encroach on theirs; and we call for self-governance
rather than governmental regulation although we are subject to both.
1. Business
According to some commentators, the "profession" of lawyers is sharply
contrasted to the "business" of people who make their livelihoods in other
ways.4 This contrast-often carrying the implication that profession is superior
to business-is not a useful contribution to today's dialogue about lawyers and
their place in society. To the contrary, the implied distinction encourages us
lawyers to inflate our own self-image while producing a corresponding backlash
of resentment in others.
The terms "profession" and "business" each have a number of meanings.
In this Essay I will reflect my preference by using the terms interchangeably to
mean, as indicated by the context, either (1) the occupation a person follows in
earning a living, or (2) the community of people engaged in an occupation. In
addition, I will sometimes use the term "business" to mean (3) a profit-oriented
enterprise engaged in by any occupation. To illustrate these meanings in a sin-
gle sentence, I regard a law firm as a business (meaning number three) in
which members of the legal profession (meaning number two) engage in the
profession (meaning number one) of practicing law. I see nothing demeaning in
calling a law firm a business, and I do not think I would improve a law firm or
its image if I called it, instead, a professional practice.
4. See, e.g., Commission on Professionalism, American Bar Association, ' . . In the Spirit of Public Ser-
vice:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986) (Report to
the ABA Board of Governors and House of Delegates, New York, N.Y., August 1986). For a critical commen-
tary, see Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Commentary on the Report of the American Bar Association
Commission on Professionalism, 18 LoYoLA U. CHI. LJ. 1149 (1987).
See also Stanley, Lawyers in Business, 8 N. ILL U.L. REV. 17 (1987); Meaning of Professionalism ... 1
PRoF. LAW, Spring 1989, at 1.
In 1988 the ABA Section on Torts and Insurance drafted a "Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism" as an
example of guidance that state and local bar associations may provide to their members. The ABA House of
Delegates authorized publication of the Creed without adopting it as ABA policy.
For some general theories of professions, see R. ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 1-30
(1988). For some futuristic views of the legal profession in the United States, see, e.g., Brill, The Law Business in
the Year 2000, AMER. LAW., June 1989, Pullout Management Report, at 1, reprinted in Tough New World,
Special Reprint Issue of AMER. LAW., Fall 1989, at 9; Gibbons, Law Practice in 2001, A.B.A.J., Jan. 1990, at 68;
Symposium, The Growth of Large Law Firms and Its Effects on the Legal Profession and Legal Education, 64
IND. LJ. 423 (1989).
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2. Unique Service and Obligations
The legal profession is unique because it renders a unique service to soci-
ety. Every other profession is also unique in offering its own service, otherwise
we would not be able to identify it as a profession at all.
A person who engages in any occupation incurs a set of obligations, some
of them legally enforceable and others based only on general consensus or indi-
vidual perceptions of moral dutyY Many of these obligations are virtually iden-
tical for all occupations. This common core of obligations generally includes the
following:
(1) Duties to client, such as informed consent (based on fair diagnosis of
the need), competent service or satisfactory products, confidentiality, courtesy,
and reasonable price;
(2) duties to other personr .in the same profession in support of such pro-
grams as education, apprenticeship, reasonable sharing of expertise and advice,
testing for competence, imposition of discipline against the unqualified, and fair
methods of competition;
(3) duties of fairness to directly-affected third parties; and
(4) duties to society involving general conformity to the public interest and
special efforts to provide essential services. If a person engages in an occupation
with the benefit of a monopoly or other special privilege conferred by society,
that person may owe society additional duties-to engage exclusively in that
occupation and to make sure society receives an adequate supply of the services
or products of that occupation.
Each profession owes, in addition, its own unique set of obligations to these
constituencies, reflecting reasonable expectations in relation to the service of-
fered by members of that occupation. We usefully may recognize some common
characteristics shared by a group of professions. For example, a lawyer's duties
are to some extent similar to those of a physician, an accountant, or a member
of another profession offering expert personal services of one kind or another.
Society has traditionally expected members of these "expert personal service"
professions to practice either in independent firms of practitioners in their re-
spective professions or as relatively independent employees of business enter-
prises, but not in the types of conglomerate organizations that have become
customary in such professions as manufacturing and merchandising. The full
range of lawyers' duties to society is unique, although some of the components
are similar to those owed by every profession and some are similar to those
owed by the expert personal service group of professions.
The duties to the several constituencies sometimes conflict. In addition,
conflict may arise between the duties to these constituencies on the one hand
and the personal values of the professional on the other. The potential for con-
flict is even greater for the person who works as an employee, such as the asso-
ciate of a law firm. The associate's primary constituency is the management of
the law firm, but the associate also incurs some level of obligation to the constit-
uencies of the law firm itself. In addition, the associate's personal values con-
5. See Levinson, Professional Independence, supra note 1.
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tribute to that individual's decisional process. A partner in a law firm faces
many of the same problems as the associate because the partner's primary con-
stituency is also the management of the firm. While the partner has a voice in
management, the partner always faces the risk of being outvoted.
Each professional, whether lawyer, automobile mechanic, or zookeeper,
must work out the inevitable conflicts. The specific duties to society are different
in each profession, but the need to accommodate conflicting duties is universal.
3. Protecting and Expanding Domain
Each occupation is likely to cling to its own distinctiveness. A traditional
method is to define the services that may be rendered by members of the profes-
sion, prevent nonmembers from rendering these services, and establish elaborate
controls on entry into membership. This type of control is most effective when
imposed by governmental action, such as the statutes and rules of court that
provide for the licensing of qualified persons as lawyers while prohibiting unli-
censed persons from engaging in the practice of law. Members of a profession
may also attempt to stake out their domain through market mechanisms, such
as public relations campaigns urging consumers to support businesses that dis-
play the emblem of membership in a certain voluntary organization. The moti-
vation for preserving the domain of the profession may be, in part, the profes-
sion's concern for its own well-being and survival, and in part the profession's
desire to serve the public interest by continuing to provide its special service.
Some members of each profession are likely to press beyond their profes-
sion's demarcated field. Their motivation may be, in part, a desire to compete
against professional peers by offering a wider range of services in the spirit of
one-stop shopping, and in part a desire to imitate the diversified type of business
operation that has brought considerable excitement, and sometimes financial
success, to other segments of society.
Individuals who try to extend their activities beyond those staked out for
their occupation are likely to encounter resistance. First, they may be accused
of encroaching on a field reserved exclusively for another occupation. Second,
they may be accused of unfair competition against members of their own pro-
fession. Finally, if they have a monopoly or other special privilege regarding the
exercise of their primary occupation, they may face two accusations-neg-
lecting to provide society with service in the occupation covered by the privilege
and taking unfair advantage of their privilege by using it as a steppingstone to
other activities.
Today's legal profession faces serious questions of domain. Some law firms
are currently branching out into nonlaw fields of business, thereby seeking to
expand into new domains.8 Some bar associations have recently sought changes
in the rules to allow law firms to admit nonlawyers as partners and, as this
Essay was going to press, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals amended
6. Chauvin, A Conscientious Conclusion, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1990, at 8; Gibbons, Branching Out, A.B.A.J.,
Nov. 1989, at 70; Is Ancillary Business the Future? I PRoF. LAW., Summer 1989, at 1. See infra notes 18-30 and
accompanying text.
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its rules to allow firms to admit nonlawyer partners in limited circumstances.7
The advocates of nonlawyer partners do not propose that the nonlawyers engage
in the practice of law. Rather, the proposal to admit nonlawyer partners is in-
tended as a means of expanding the law firm's practice into new domains or
obtaining a source of investment capital. For reasons discussed throughout this
Essay, I assert that an adequate number of law firms should limit their domain
to the practice of law and that no law firm should admit any nonlawyer to
partnership.
4. Self-governance vs. Governmental Regulation
Members of a profession understandably welcome governmental licensing
laws to protect their exclusive right to engage in a specific occupation. At the
same time, members often assert the superiority of self-governance over govern-
mental regulation.
In fact, each profession is likely to face a combination of governmental and
nongovernmental regulation. Despite recent tendencies toward deregulation and
free competition, licensing laws provide a basic framework for governmental
control of many occupations, including the practice of law. In the case of li-
censed professionals, the question is not whether government will regulate, but
how far this regulation will go. An organization speaking for the profession may
persuade the government to regulate in a benign manner by demonstrating that
the profession has its own means of maintaining standards in the public interest.
Lawyers talk a lot about the self-governance of our profession but we are
actually regulated pervasively by government. Some of the regulation is con-
tained in rules of court and is administered by judges, in contrast to the legisla-
tive and executive actions that regulate members of other occupations. Regula-
tion by judges is, nevertheless, regulation by government, and this is not
changed by the fact that many of the judges are lawyers. The average lawyer
can exert no more control over the judge than the average physician can exert
over the legislative and executive officials who regulate the practice of medicine.
One of the most heavily regulated occupations is that of the litigator, who
practices law in the very presence of a judge who can enforce standards in-
stantly. Even nonlitigating lawyers are governed by detailed rules of conduct.
We participate to a limited extent in the government's regulation of our profes-
sion; for example, we provide input during the rulemaking process, our members
often serve on disciplinary boards, and we have some influence on the selection
of the judges who, in turn, generally control our disciplinary system. Within the
framework allowed by governmental regulation, we can adopt additional stan-
dards for our own self-governance, such as establishing committees to render
advisory opinions on proper professional conduct or voluntary programs for ren-
7. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the
Rules?, 40 HASTINGs LJ. 577 (1989); Fitzpatrick, Legal Future Shock: The Role of Large Law Firms by the
End of the Century, 64 IND. L.J. 461 (1989); Gilbert & Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals
Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 383 (1988). See infra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
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dering pro bono service. Later in this Essay I will consider the possibility of our
adopting voluntary standards of law firm independence.
B. Distinctiveness of the Legal Profession
I perceive only one feature that significantly distinguishes the legal profes-
sion from all others. This feature is the connection between the legal profession
and the legal system. We derive our uniqueness from that of the legal system,
which reflects society's achievements and its aspirations for structuring an or-
derly community. Society has made an incalculable investment in the creation
and refinement of its legal system. We lawyers have participated in the process
as members of society and as experts in the law, but the constantly evolving
legal system belongs to society, not to our profession. The essence of our busi-
ness as lawyers is to make society's own legal system accessible to society.8
Some nonlawyers render similar services to a limited extent, but only law-
yers demonstrate the expertise needed to render the full range of legal services
and only lawyers are licensed to render the full range of these services. The
legal profession is the dominant source of legal services as regards market share
and social impact.
This connection wiih the legal system prompts me to describe ours as a
public profession, or at least a quasi-public one. The license to practice law is
one of the highest honors society can confer on any of its members. We are
allowed to earn a living-and some of us earn very handsome livings-from
exercising our profession. We should never forget the duty that comes with the
license.
C. Legal Profession's Special Need to Preserve Independence
Society has allowed the legal profession, and no other group, to perform
the function of making society's legal system accessible to society. We are fidu-
ciaries of the legal system. Like other fiduciaries, we must perform our duties in
the exercise of our own independent judgment and we must perform these du-
ties ourselves, without delegating them to anyone else. For this reason, we have
a special obligation to do whatever we can to preserve our independence, for
society's sake as well as our own.
An independent legal profession is in the strongest possible position to give
clients objective advice and vigorous representation. The delivery of this service
benefits not only the clients but also third parties, including government, who
rely on the service. Society benefits as well, first because society has an interest
in making sure that everyone has access to the best possible legal service, and
second because the rendition of legal service to any client contributes, in its own
way, to the evolution of the legal system itself. In order to produce these bene-
fits, the legal profession has recognized its duty to help make legal services
available to everyone who needs them, although we are far from achieving this
objective.
8. See Levinson, Society Access, supra note 1.
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An independent legal profession offers other benefits to society besides the
functions of advising and representing clients. The legal profession has played a
key role in bringing legal issues to the attention of society, initiating and debat-
ing proposals for law reform, confronting governmental arbitrariness, and dis-
couraging governmental tyranny. Virtually all judges of courts of general juris-
diction are recruited from the legal profession and many judicial appointments
are heavily influenced by the recommendations of the legal profession.
The role of the legal profession in society is often embroiled in controversy.
We have not always received a good press, neither have we always deserved one.
Our bad press may be, in part, an inevitable result of our role as advisors, repre-
sentatives, and advocates, but it also results in part from our own shortcomings.
Our profession has many defects and we face a long, hard journey before we
can overcome them. On balance, however, I am convinced that we have con-
ferred essential benefits upon society, and that we can and should continue to do
so. We can best improve ourselves and serve society by preserving and strength-
ening the independence of our profession.
A strong and independent legal profession could itself pose risks to society
by identifying with an oppressive regime, establishing its own enclave of privi-
lege, or in other ways frustrating the public interest. These risks are most likely
to materialize if access to the profession is limited on the basis of gender, social
class, political affiliation, or wealth. When faced with a limited-access legal pro-
fession, society must depend on the profession's own noblesse or on counter-
vailing forces to protect against abuse by the profession.
In recent years the legal profession in the United States has identified more
closely with the public interest than in the past, due in part to the increasing
presence of lawyers from previously underrepresented segments of society. The
continuation of this trend toward a legal profession that reflects society in all its
diversity provides the best assurance that the profession will serve the public
interest. In planning for the legal profession of the future, therefore, we may
anticipate a profession that can be entrusted with a substantial level of
independence.
The new Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Community pro-
vides a valuable perspective, although the role of law and the legal profession
may vary appreciably from one country or continent to another. The European
Code insists on the complete independence of individual lawyers and the profes-
sion as a whole. The Code asserts that "the existence of a free and independent
[legal] profession, bound together by respect for rules made by the profession
itself, is an essential means of safeguarding human rights in [the] face of the
power of the state and other interests in society."9
9. COUNCIL OF THE BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY § 1.1 (1988). The organization is generally known as CCBE, derived
from the French title "Conseil Consultative des Barreaux de la Communaut6 Europ6ene" (although the word
"Consultative" does not appear in the official French title of the Council). For further discussion of developments
in Europe, see infra notes 70-74.
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D. How Independent Law Firms Can Contribute to an Independent Legal
Profession
The independence of our profession requires protection against pressure
from various sources. Today's relatively tolerant regulation of lawyers, centered
in the judiciary but involving other branches of government as well, could be-
come oppressive if the political climate changed. Our relatively independent re-
lationships with the political process, with the news media, with major economic
forces, and with other professions could also be transformed into sources of seri-
ous pressure.
Public opinion is one of the factors that determine the level of our indepen-
dence. As long as public opinion of the legal profession is generally favorable,
we are likely to retain extensive privileges, including our monopoly over the
rendition of legal services. If public opinion becomes generally unfavorable, we
risk a reduction of our privileges.
Another significant factor is the extent of our freedom to exercise indepen-
dent professional judgment when we render legal services. Our ability to exer-
cise independent professional judgment depends, first, on our capacity to ex-
amine and evaluate the situation objectively, without having our perception
impaired by competing forces. Once we have achieved objectivity, our exercise
of independent professional judgment depends on our own perceptions of the
risks we run by exercising our independent judgment and the manner in which
we will react if these risks materialize. The independent law firm is in a strong
position to achieve maximum objectivity, minimum risks, and maximum inde-
pendence of its response to any risk that materializes. As indicated below, this
type of firm can provide strength to lawyers in other situations, some of whom
face higher risks and slimmer chances of reacting independently.
Most lawyers are employees-of house counsel staffs, of governmental law
departments, or of law firms-facing risks that vary from one type of employ-
ment to another and from one jurisdiction to another. Governmental lawyers
receive significant protection from civil service laws, from the public-spirited
attitude of many of their supervisors, and from the availability of alternative
careers in the private sector (often with higher compensation).
In the private sector the extent of the risk depends, in part, on the law of
the controlling jurisdiction regarding the employment at will doctrine. Some
states interpret that doctrine to deny any relief to an employee for discharge
from employment, whether the discharge was based on a good reason, a bad
reason, or no reason, unless the employment contract provides for a remedy.
Other states, recognizing a public policy exception to the employment at will
doctrine, give relief to employees if the employer violated public policy in dis-
charging them from employment. Courts in the latter states might therefore
give relief to an employed lawyer who was discharged for insisting on exercising
professional judgment or complying with other rules of professional conduct.'0
10. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980) (recognizing
cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee-in this case a physician-when the discharge is contrary
to clear public policy mandate). But see Herbster v. North American Co., 150 I11. App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343
1990]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Even if a remedy for wrongful discharge is available, however, employed law-
yers have strong incentives to avoid confrontation with their employers to pre-
serve a trouble-free employment record.
Senior level employed lawyers, such as house counsel, have special respon-
sibilities to exercise professional independence when advising corporate manage-
ment and the board of directors. House counsel also owe a special duty to pro-
tect the professional independence of the junior lawyers they supervise. No
doubt the vast majority of house counsel act with complete integrity, giving
sound advice that persuades corporations to act legally and sensibly. But house
counsel is a member of the management team, in daily contact with manage-
ment, involved in management's planning process, often holding corporate office
and owning shares or employee stock options. It may be difficult for house coun-
sel to take an objective view of a legal issue that vitally affects the well-being of
the corporation. Without an objective view, house counsel may be unable to
exercise independent professional judgment. Similarly, general counsel of a gov-
ernmental agency may be so deeply involved with other public officials in mat-
ters of planning and policymaking as to lose the objectivity required for the
exercise of independent professional judgment. The lawyer employed as an asso-
ciate in a law firm, or as junior counsel under the supervision of house counsel
or governmental general counsel, faces special risks, to be discussed later. 1
The law firm, as an independent contractor, presents a significant contrast
to the employed lawyer. Of course the firm and its partners are under pressure
to provide sufficient revenue to cover expenses and yield an attractive return to
the partners. No firm takes a light view of exercising independent professional
judgment if the likely result is loss of an existing or potential client. If, however,
the firm is fully independent of its clients, the firm may be expected to achieve
greater objectivity and exercise its independent professional judgment with
greater freedom than could be expected of an employed lawyer. Within the law
firm, the partner may have a voice in management and may have some protec-
tion against summary removal from the firm, but is still accountable to the
firm's management and consequently faces some of the same risks faced by an
associate.
The level of independence of the legal profession as a whole is determined
to a great extent by the law firms in private practice. These firms are in the
strongest position to give clients objective and independent advice. In addition,
the firms are the major employers of beginning lawyers and provide ongoing
opportunities for career changes by lateral moves from other segments of the
profession. Thus an independent law firm may tend to attract independence-
seeking lawyers away from other segments of the profession that offer a less
(1989) (denying relief to head of in-house law department who alleged he had been fired for refusing to destroy
documents sought in discovery and holding that every lawyer's contract of employment is, by implication, a con-
tract of employment at will). A case on appeal from a New York trial court may give the appellate courts of that
state an opportunity to rule on this issue. See Wieder v. Skala, 144 Misc. 2d 346, 544 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1989) (appeal anticipated to N.Y. App. Div.) (trial court relied on employment at will doctrine as basis for
dismissing associate's complaint against law firm for wrongful discharge). See generally Wilbur, Wrongful Dis-
charge of Attorneys: A Cause of Action to Further Professional Responsibility, 92 DICK. L. REV. 777 (1988).
1I. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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independent setting. Further, corporate management may be willing to accept
the sound advice of house counsel if management anticipates that an indepen-
dent law firm is likely to reinforce that advice. In addition to their role in repre-
senting clients, the law firms also exert strong influence in bar associations, in
making recommendations for judicial selection, and in the public forum. In each
of these areas, the legal profession and society are best served if law firms gen-
erally possess a high level of independence.
In summary, firms engaged in the private practice of law tend to function
as pacesetters regarding the independence of the profession as a whole. So long
as the legal profession includes a significant number and variety of independent
firms, the entire profession is likely to maintain a reasonable level of
independence.
II. ATTRIBUTES OF THE INDEPENDENT LAW FIRM
The Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct require lawyers to meet certain standards of independence. For
example, a lawyer may not admit a nonlawyer as partner in a law firm12 and
must exercise independent professional judgment.13 This latter requirement is
clarified in more detailed provisions to the effect that a lawyer may not re-
present clients with conflicting interests, 14 invest in the client's litigation,' 5 or
accept exclusive literary rights in lieu of a cash fee.' Although these rules ad-
dress individual lawyers, they apply indirectly to the law firm as well.' 7
These provisions of the Code and Model Rules should remain in effect or
be refined by the work of others. My proposed attributes partially overlap with
the existing standards but go far beyond them in attempting to assure the inde-
pendence of the law firm.
In discussing my proposed attributes of the independent law firm, I men-
tion various advantages and disadvantages, including some that may relate only
indirectly to the issue of independence. These matters have relevance because
the whole question of independence requires an exercise of policy judgment,
which can benefit from a broad view of all consequences likely to flow from
adopting one approach or another.
12. Supra note 2.
13. Supra note 3.
14. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
15. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.8(j) (1983).
16. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(B) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.8(d) (1983).
17. Model Rule 5.1 requires partners and supervisory lawyers to ensure that the law firm complies with the
rules of professional conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 (1983). In addition, both the
Code and Model Rules recognize the existence of law firms, for example, by prohibiting a lawyer from accepting
employment if another lawyer in the same firm is precluded, on certain grounds, from accepting the same employ-
ment. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rules 1.10, 1.11 (1983).
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A. The Firm's Only Business Is the Practice of Law
Within the past few years, law firms have branched out into nonlaw activi-
ties at an unprecedented pace. A recent article in the American Bar Association
(ABA) Journal reports that forty-five law firms own nonlaw businesses, either
as divisions of the law firm or as affiliated or subsidiary enterprises. 18 In my
view, these law firms are not engaged in the independent practice of law. If all
law firms in the country followed their example, the independence of the legal
profession would be seriously impaired and possibly destroyed.
In the current controversy, the issue is whether law firms may properly
engage in activities which everyone concedes are outside the practice of law. No
serious dispute has yet arisen as to the meaning of the term "practice of law" in
this context. Anticipating that such a dispute may arise in the future, we must
consider how to define the term.
One approach is to use the term in this context with the same meaning it
has in connection with statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law; in
that setting, the term refers to those services which only lawyers are permitted
to perform. If the same meaning were used in the present discussion about lim-
iting law firms to the practice of law only, it would mean that law firms may do
only that which nonlawyers may not do. If applied literally, this meaning would
prohibit the firm from rendering supporting services such as typing and investi-
gation. It would also prohibit the firm from rendering certain types of legal
services in areas in which the legal profession does not have a monopoly. For
example, under federal law, tax practice may be performed by nonlawyers as
well as lawyers.19 From these examples it becomes apparent that the definition
derived from statutes on the unauthorized practice of law is not suitable in the
context now under discussion.
Instead, I suggest that the "practice of law" means, in this context, (1) the
use of knowledge, skills, and judgment about the legal system, 20 together with
the rendition of supporting services, (2) for the benefit of another person, (3) at
a level of expertise and in a setting that a reasonable person would consider
appropriate to the practice of law. This definition emphasizes the essential ele-
ments of the practice of law and allows the law firm to render supporting ser-
vices, as well as legal services in areas where the legal profession does not have
a monopoly, while giving some room for a reasonable person to interpret these
elements in conformity with changing times and places.
18. Gibbons, supra note 6. The types of nonlaw businesses found most often in these 45 law firms are:
Consulting for financial services, 6 firms; employee benefits and labor relations consulting, 4 firms; financial news-
letters, videos and seminars, 4 firms; international trade consulting, 9 firms; lobbying and legislative services, 7
firms.
The states in which these law firms most often branch out are: District of Columbia, 21 firms; California, 7
firms; Massachusetts, 5 firms; New York, 7 firms; Washington (state), 5 firms. Gibbons, supra note 6, at 73
(citations omitted).
19. The Agency Practice Act of 1965, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1988), entitles any lawyer or certified public ac-
countant to practice before any federal administrative agency (except the Patent and Trademark Office, which
may impose additional requirements). Agencies may provide for the admission of other qualified persons, and for
the discipline of all practitioners including lawyers, public accountants, and others.
20. This language accords with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1980).
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The supporting services mentioned in the above definition clearly include
the services of secretaries, investigators, and others who perform under a law-
yer's supervision and in support of a lawyer's rendition of legal services. I would
place, in the same category, services rendered by expert employees or consul-
tants in nonlaw fields, such as accountants or economists, but only if they func-
tion under a lawyer's supervision and in support of a lawyer's rendition of legal
services.
A law firm may, however, experience difficulty in obtaining the services of
a nonlawyer expert who is willing to function under the supervision and in sup-
port of a lawyer. The lawyer may not have enough expertise in the nonlaw field
to function effectively as a supervisor and the professional standards of the
nonlaw expert may prohibit the expert from working under the supervision of
anyone outside the expert's own profession. Existing rules tend, in addition, to
discourage the employment of nonlawyer experts by prohibiting lawyers from
sharing fees with nonlawyers.2 ' I find these rules unjustified because fee-sharing
does not impair the independence of the law firm. Accordingly I favor their
relaxation to permit law firms to enter into fee-sharing or profit-sharing ar-
rangements with nonlawyers, provided these arrangements do not give the
nonlawyers any equity interest or managerial role in the law firm.
An independent law firm may prudently advise the client to obtain nonlaw
services from experts outside the law firm who can collaborate with the law firm
in the interests of the client without serving under the supervision or in support
of a lawyer. As another solution, an independent law firm may consider recruit-
ing dual practitioners licensed to practice both law and another profession. A
person licensed, for example, both as a lawyer and a certified public accountant
(CPA) may appropriately provide accounting advice in support of the law firm's
rendition of legal services and may supervise nonlawyer CPAs who provide sim-
ilar accounting advice.22
A closer question arises if the lawyer-CPA renders accounting services
through a law firm in matters unrelated to the firm's rendition of legal services.
The firm properly cannot be described merely as a law firm; it must instead
fully identify the nature of its practice. In addition, the firm should make sure
that each client fully understands whether each engagement will be for legal
services, accounting services, or a blend of the two. This type of understanding
is essential because the different types of engagement may involve different
rules of professional conduct on matters such as confidentiality, and different
expectations on the part of clients and third parties. If these requirements are
met, it appears that a law firm can satisfy the essential attributes of indepen-
dence even if a dual practitioner renders nonlegal services to the firm's clients in
matters unrelated to the firm's rendition of legal services.
21. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102(A) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a) (1983).
22. In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I am an attorney and a certified public accountant, have
practiced each profession at different times, and am keenly aware of the different roles played and attitudes
required by each profession.
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No doubt the law firm that branches out beyond the practice of law offers
some advantages. These include (1) the convenience of one-stop shopping, (2)
the intellectual benefit of an ongoing relationship between the lawyers and
nonlaw experts in the firm, (3) the ease and speed in selecting nonlaw experts,
(4) the possible fee savings if the nonlaw experts provide brief consultations
without having to be called in from the outside, and (5) the possible fee savings
and maximization of quality resulting from the operation of a freely competitive
market.
These advantages are, however, outweighed by the numerous disadvantages
of branching out, except in the case of dual practitioners discussed above. The
following risks would make me think at least twice before engaging in one-stop
shopping if I were a client:
(1) The risk of distraction of the law firm from the practice of law, leading
to the risk of impaired competence and diligence of lawyers and supervisors,
especially if the lawyers themselves attempt to render nonlegal services;
(2) the risk that the conduct of nonlawyers will not be governed by coher-
ent, enforceable standards which are compatible with lawyers' standards on
matters such as confidentiality and conflicts of interest;
(3) the risk that the law firm will supervise nonlawyers inadequately, either
because the lawyers lack the necessary expertise or because the nonlawyers are
prohibited, by the rules governing their own professional conduct, from submit-
ting to supervision by nonmembers of their professions;
(4) the risk that professional liability insurance and client security funds
will not cover losses caused by nonlawyers;
(5) the risk that the law firm, having made an economic commitment to its
nonlaw personnel, will tend to use them at full capacity, whether clients happen
to need their services or not;
(6) the related risk that the law firm will lose its objectivity in advising the
client (a) whether a nonlaw expert is needed, (b) if so, who that expert should
be, and (c) if an expert is retained, whether that person is rendering satisfactory
services at a fair price;
(7) the related risk that the work product of the law firm will not be credi-
ble or acceptable to third parties because of their doubts as to the law firm's
objectivity with regard to the nonlaw experts;
(8) the risk that clients, potential clients, and third parties will be confused
or misled as to the role of nonlawyers in the firm; and
(9) the risk that nonlawyers, even if not partners, will unduly influence the
firm in (a) matters of law firm management (including, for example, decisions
whether to accept unpopular clients, or on the selection, retention, and promo-
tion of lawyers), (b) participation in activities of the legal profession (such as
commenting on proposed new rules of conduct or establishing pro bono pro-
grams), and (c) performance of the public role of the legal profession.
If the legal profession becomes heavily populated and influenced by firms
that offer significant amounts of nonlegal as well as legal services, we may an-
ticipate the following additional disadvantages:
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(1) The risk that the market will redistribute nonlegal as well as legal tal-
ent into the most profitable subject matter and geographical areas of practice,
causing shortages in other areas;
(2) the risk that the market, after an initial flurry of fee reductions, will
concentrate nonlegal as well as legal services in a small number of large firms,
leading to fee increases;
(3) the risk that law firms will make attractive offers to governmental
nonlawyers as well as lawyers, of employment after termination of governmen-
tal service, with the result that (a) nonlawyers as well as lawyers in government
will have personal reasons for urging relaxation of current restrictions on
postgovernment employment, (b) nonlawyers as well as lawyers will be tempted
while in government to compromise the exercise of their independent judgment
as public officials because of their personal interest in post-governmental em-
ployment, and (c) the relationship between law firms and government may be-
come so close as to compromise the independence of both;
(4) the risk that society will perceive the legal profession as moving into
nonlaw businesses through the unfair use of its privileged position (including
use of information received in confidence from clients) and that society will
react by revoking some privileges or otherwise curtailing the independence of
the legal profession;
(5) the related risk that society will perceive the legal profession as neglect-
ing the practice of law despite a huge unmet need for legal services and that
society will react by revoking some privileges such as our monopoly over the
rendition of legal services; 3 and
(6) the risk that the legal profession will lose its distinctiveness as it blends
into a broader profession of business advisors; that it will attract a different type
of person; that its members will develop a different self-perception; and that its
traditional role in society will be forgotten and abandoned, or left in the hands
of a relatively small and uninfluential group of practitioners who limit them-
selves to rendering legal services only.
I intend no disrespect to nonlawyers. Some of them may well be at least as
diligent and socially sensitive as any lawyer. My point is simply that nonlawyers
did not identify themselves with the legal profession when choosing a career;
have not been imbued with the learning, traditions, values, lore, or public mis-
sion of the legal profession; may not even be familiar with our rules of profes-
sional conduct; and will inevitably impair the distinctiveness of the firm as a law
firm. A law firm jeopardizes its independence by conducting a nonlaw business
and by involving nonlawyers in any role beyond that of supporting the lawyers.
If large numbers of law firms engage in this conduct, they will seriously impair
the distinctiveness and independence of the legal profession.
As this Essay was going to press, the American Bar Association Section of
Litigation adopted a recommendation imposing stringent limits on the rendition
23. The possible erosion of the legal profession's monopoly is illustrated by Walters v. National Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985). See also Levinson, Professional Responsibility Issues in Administra-
tive Adjudication, 2 B.Y.U.J. PuB. L. 219, 252-54 (1988); Note, The Proper Scope of Nonlawyer Representation
in State Administrative Proceedings: A State Specific Balancing Approach, 43 VAND. L. REv. 245 (1990).
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of nonlegal services by law firms.2 ' If the ABA House of Delegates approves
this recommendation, the policy of the ABA will be to urge state courts or
legislatures to impose these limits by amending their rules of professional
conduct.
In essence, the proposal would allow law firms to render nonlaw services
which are ancillary to legal services rendered to the firm's clients, but only if
the services are rendered by employees of the law firm.2" The proposal would
prohibit a law firm from using a subsidiary or affiliate as the means for provid-
ing nonlaw services which are ancillary to the practice of law, but would allow a
law firm to own or operate an entity which provides services or products unre-
lated to the practice of law, and to own or operate real estate or other physical
facilities.26 The proposal reaffirms the ABA policy against admitting nonlawyers
to partnership in law firms.2 7
If fully implemented, this recommendation would require every law firm to
comply with the virtual equivalent of my first proposed attribute of indepen-
dence-that the law firm's only business is the practice of law, including nonlaw
supporting services. I do not object to the approach taken by the Recommenda-
tion in accomplishing this objective by adoption of across-the-board rules. As
indicated later in this Essay, however, I would be satisfied with a less coercive
approach, so long as it gave reasonable assurance that society would have access
to an adequate number and variety of independent law firms.28 I recognize the
24. SECTION OF LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT ON LAW
FIRMS' ANCILLARY BUSINESS ACTIVITIES (Feb. 8, 1990). The matter is scheduled for possible action by the ABA
House of Delegates in August 1990. The recommendation states:
1. A law firm (which shall mean an association of two or more attorneys, a partnership or a corporation
engaged in the practice of law), or one or more attorneys in a law firm, shall neither own a controlling
interest in, nor operate, an entity which provides non-legal services which are ancillary to the practice
of law, nor otherwise provide such ancillary non-legal services, except as provided in Paragraph 3.
2. Two or more attorneys who engage in the practice of law in separate law firms shall neither own a
controlling interest in, nor operate, an entity which provides non-legal services which are ancillary to
the practice of law, except as provided in subsection (5) of Paragraph 3.
3. A law firm may provide non-legal services which are ancillary to the practice of law if:
(1) The ancillary services are provided solely to clients of the law firm and are incidental to, in
connection with and concurrent to, the provision of legal services by the law firm to such clients;
(2) Such ancillary services are provided solely by employees of the law firm itself and not by a
subsidiary or other affiliate of the law firm;
(3) The law firm makes appropriate disclosure in writing to its clients; and
(4) The law firm does not hold itself out as engaging in any non-legal activities except in conjunc-
tion with the provision of legal services, as provided in this rule; provided however,
(5) Nothing in this rule shall prevent a law firm, or one or more lawyers, from (i) owning or
operating an entity which provides services or products unrelated, and functionally unconnected,
to the provision of legal services, or (ii) owning physical facilities (for use by the law firm and/or
others) or otherwise owning real estate and serving as a lessor.
4. An individual engaged in the solo practice of law may provide non-legal services which are ancillary to
the practice of law, subject to appropriate disclosure requirements.
5. The American Bar Association opposes any attempts to permit non-lawyers to obtain equity interests in
law firms or otherwise permit them to share in legal fees generated by lawyers (except as provided in
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4(a) and Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 3-
102(a)).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See supra note 2.
28. See infra note 58-61 and accompanying text.
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difficulty of designing a less coercive system that provides this level of
assurance.
The Recommendation also coincides with my views by reaffirming existing
rules that prohibit the admission of nonlawyers to partnerships in law firms.2"
The Recommendation is silent about the topics covered by my other proposed
attributes of law firm independence.3 0
B. The Firm Is Owned Exclusively by One or More Lawyers Who Are En-
gaged Actively in the Firm's Practice (with Narrow Exceptions)
The independent law firm should be owned exclusively by one or more law-
yers who are engaged actively in the firm's practice, with a few narrow excep-
tions. Under these exceptions, I propose to allow ownership, but without any
managerial authority, by personal representatives of deceased owners, lawyers
who take a temporary leave of absence from the firm, or lawyers who acquired
their ownership interest during active practice with the firm and have retired
completely from the practice of law. I will discuss the major aspects of the
proposal separately-first, the exclusion of active nonlawyers from ownership;
second, the exclusion of inactive nonlawyers; third, the exclusion of inactive
lawyers; and finally, the proposed exceptional situations in which I would allow
nonlawyers or inactive lawyers to own interests in law firms.
1. Active Nonlawyers
The rules of conduct in every jurisdiction currently prohibit nonlawyers
from owning interests in law firms, except for the personal representatives of
deceased members of the firm.3' Effective January 1, 1991, however, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals will allow nonlawyers to be partners in lim-
ited circumstances.32 For purposes of clarity, this Essay will refer to the rule
that will take effect in 1991 in the District of Columbia as the "D.C. rule." The
Essay will refer to the rule in all other jurisdictions as the "ABA rule" because
it reflects the policy of the American Bar Association. The ABA rule is not
controversial insofar as it allows personal representatives of deceased members
to own interests in law firms. The remainder of the rule has been and continues
to be controversial. It faced a serious challenge in the early 1980s when the
Kutak Commission began drafting the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to
replace the Code of Professional Responsibility. The first drafts of the Model
Rules omitted this rule without comment. After the omission was exposed and
debated, the Commission reinserted the rule and the ABA adopted it in 1983 as
part of the Model Rules. 3
29. See supra note 2 and infra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
31. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(C) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(d) (1983).
32. See infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
33. See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 7.
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More recently, bar associations in two jurisdictions have petitioned their
respective courts to repeal or relax the rule. The North Dakota Supreme Court
decided to keep the rule unchanged. As this Essay was going to press, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted new Rules of Professional Conduct
effective January 1, 1991. These Rules include a new rule allowing nonlawyers
to be partners in District of Columbia law firms.34
The precise impact of the D.C. rule is difficult to determine. A key provi-
sion allows nonlawyers to be partners in law firms.provided they perform profes-
sional services which assist the firm in providing legal services to clients.35 Ac-
cording to the comment accompanying the rule,
the Rule permits economists to work in a firm with antitrust or public utility practi-
tioners, psychologists or psychiatric social workers to work with family law practition-
ers to assist in counseling clients, nonlawyer lobbyists to work with lawyers who per-
form legislative services, certified public accountants to work in conjunction with tax
lawyers or others who use accountants' services in performing legal services, and pro-
fessional managers to serve as office managers, executive directors, or in similar posi-
tions. In all of these situations, the professionals may be given financial interests or
managerial responsibility, so long as all of the requirements of subparagraph (c) are
met. 38
The cited subparagraph prohibits nonlawyers from directing or regulating the
lawyer's professional judgment in rendering legal services. 37
In view of the comment quoted above, it appears that the D.C. Court
would not allow law firms to offer partnerships to nonlawyers whose primary
role is the "rainmaking" function of attracting clients to the firm. 8 The literal
text of the D.C. rule, however, could be interpreted as allowing such persons to
be partners on the theory that rainmakers comply with the rule by performing
"professional services which assist the organization in providing legal services to
clients."39
Under another provision of the D.C. rule, nonlawyer partners must under-
take to "abide by" the rules of professional conduct for lawyers.4 It is not clear
whether this Rule would allow nonlawyers, for example, to determine the situa-
34. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, reprinted in BAR REP., Feb./Mar. 1990,
adopted March 1, 1990, effective January 1, 1991. The new rule on nonlawyer partners, Rule 5.4(b), is worded as
follows:
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in which a financial interest
is held or managerial authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs professional services
which assist the organization in providing legal services to clients, but only if:
(I) the partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal services to clients;
(2) all persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial interest undertake to abide by
these rules of professional conduct;
(3) the lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the partnership or organiza-
tion undertake to he responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent as if nonlawyer
participants were lawyers under rule 5.1;
(4) the foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
Id., reprint supp. at 44-45.
35. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(b)(1).
36. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 comment, 7.
37. Id., Rule 5.4(c).
38. See infra note 43.
39. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(b).
40. Id., Rule 5.4(b)(2).
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tions in which a client's confidences could be revealed or in which conflicts of
interest require withdrawal or disqualification.
Uncertainty also exists regarding the jurisdictional sweep of the new D.C.
rule. Lawyers who are in partnership with nonlawyers will be allowed to prac-
tice in the courts of the District of Columbia effective January 1, 1991, but the
D.C. rule cannot guarantee these lawyers the right to practice in federal courts
because each federal court has the power to establish its own qualifications for
admitting lawyers to practice. 1 Lawyers in the District of Columbia should
also recognize that Congress, by amending the Agency Practice Act,"2 could
restrict the right of lawyers with nonlawyer partners to practice before federal
administrative agencies, or Congress could allow the agencies to exercise their
own discretion in this area. Further uncertainties will face law firms that main-
tain offices in both the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions if the other
jurisdictions determine that their own public policy is violated by the presence
of a nonlawyer partner in the District of Columbia office of the law firm.
A firm that admits a nonlawyer as a partner, under any interpretation of
the D.C. rule, will lose some of its independence. If other jurisdictions relax
their rules and all law firms admit nonlawyers as partners, the legal profession
will risk a substantial loss of its independence.
Again, I intend no disrespect to nonlawyers. My concerns here are similar
to those expressed above regarding the rendition of nonlaw services with the
following additional observations. The admission of nonlaw partners could con-
fer an additional benefit upon the client by giving the law firm a better chance
of attracting the most highly qualified nonlawyers. The additional disadvantage
is that, if nonlawyers are partners, they are more likely to exert influence on the
firm and, ultimately, on the profession. Even if the nonlawyer was a nonvoting
partner with a share in the profits, that person would be likely to have some
influence, similar to that of a holder of preferred stock in a corporation, espe-
cially in difficult times. Another concern is that the law firm's need for the
professional services of the nonlawyer partner may fluctuate considerably. That
person is unlikely to have the flexibility of a lawyer in being able to move into a
different area of the firm's practice. Accordingly, the law firm may be tempted
strongly to make full use of the nonlawyer's services even though clients do not
really need them. If the nonlawyer's services cannot be used fully, that person's
position as a partner is likely to end. If fluctuations in the law firm's practice
cause nonlawyer partners to join and leave the firm in quick succession, the firm
may face an undesirable level of volatility in the roster of its partners.
We should also consider the possibility that nonlawyers, if admitted to
partnership, could serve the law firm as "rainmakers," bringing in new clients
and doing little if anything else.' 3 The firm could become heavily dependent on
an effective nonlawyer rainmaker, and that individual could possibly exert even
greater influence on the firm than could a nonlawyer who simply rendered a
41. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS § 15.2.4 (1986).
42. Supra note 19.
43. The importance of the role of the rainmaker is illustrated in Eichbaum, Lieberman & Pennachio, Mid-
size Firms Vie for Rainmakers, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 29, 1990, at 24.
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nonlaw service, such as accounting, to the firm's clients. Further, in the event of
impasse or unacceptable conduct, the nonlaw partner would be more difficult to
remove than a nonlaw employee or consultant.
The proposal now under discussion-to continue excluding nonlawyers
from partnership in law firms-is the most important in this Essay. I urge re-
tention of the ABA rule which imposes this standard on every law firm. If the
rule is ever relaxed or repealed, I urge every law firm to continue voluntarily to
admit only lawyers to partnerships.
The identity and distinctiveness of the legal profession stand the best
chance of surviving if we permit only lawyers to be partners in law firms. Uni-
versal compliance with this standard will protect the legal profession by signifi-
cantly limiting the ability of law firms to branch out into nonlaw businesses.
Further, so long as the partners in law firms are all lawyers, we have an
unimpaired opportunity to resolve our numerous other problems together with
an undiluted responsibility to do so.
The ABA Section on Litigation recently adopted a recommendation to re-
affirm the rule that allows only lawyers to be partners in law firms.""
2. Inactive Nonlawyers
If nonlawyers are allowed to become partners (or shareholders) in a law
firm without being active in the firm's practice, they can provide a useful source
of financing but will impair the firm's independence because of their expectation
of a return on investment. Even if the inactive nonlaw investors owned nonvot-
ing preferred stock, they would still be in a position to exert pressure on the law
firm, as indicated above in the case of a nonvoting active partner.
Many firms are heavily dependent on professional liability insurance carri-
ers, banks, or other sources of insurance and financing. I recognize that insur-
ance and debt financing are virtual necessities. I can only hope that law firms
can obtain them without unduly yielding their independence to these sources.
My proposal, however, prohibits equity financing by inactive lawyers. The dis-
tinction may in some situations be perceived as arbitrary and formalistic. Sens-
ing the need to draw a line somewhere, I make the distinction based on the
assumption that debt can be paid off, if necessary by refinancing, in contrast to
the relative permanence of equity investment, and that lenders are less likely
than owners to exercise significant control over the firm's management.
3. Inactive Lawyers
Existing rules tacitly allow ownership of interests in law firms by lawyers
who are not active in the firm and who may not be active in any firm. Thus, the
rules now allow a lawyer to be an inactive investor in an unlimited number of
law firms. The rules also apparently allow law firms to own interests in other
law firms.
44. See supra -note 24.
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These possible arrangements depart from the tradition of the owner-man-
aged law firm. They produce a separation between the law firm's owners and its
working personnel, requiring delegation of decisional authority from the owners
to managers. Individual lawyers in the firm may then have no access to the
owners, although the owners remain ultimately responsible for the decisions of
the firm.45
Ownership by inactive lawyers is not as serious as ownership by nonlaw-
yers. It does, however, impair the independence of those who work for the firm
by placing them under the ultimate control of inactive lawyers in a situation
where the workers do not have an opportunity to discuss professional issues with
these owners. Such a firm does not provide its lawyers with the camaraderie or
sense of professional equality which are most conducive to the exercise of inde-
pendent professional judgment. In the interests of the professional independence
of all lawyers in the firm, I suggest that inactive lawyers should not own inter-
ests in law firms except in the limited situations mentioned in my proposal and
discussed below.
4. The Proposed Exceptions
My proposal allows three categories of persons to own interests in law firms
although they are not lawyers actively engaged in the firm's practice. In each of
these exceptional situations, however, the owner must not have any managerial
authority.
My first exception simply preserves the existing rule that allows personal
representatives of deceased owners to retain the interests of their decedents for
a reasonable period of time. The need for this rule is obvious and I am not
aware of any controversy about it.
The second exception allows ownership by lawyers who take a temporary
leave of absence from the firm. This type of situation could arise, for example, if
a member of the firm was elected or appointed to public office under circum-
stances in which the law allowed that person to retain an inactive association
with the firm. This situation is not likely to arise often and I do not regard my
proposal on this matter as being controversial.
The final exception allows ownership without managerial authority by a
lawyer who acquired his or her ownership during active practice with the firm
and has retired completely from the practice of law. This would permit a law
firm's partnership agreement to provide for fully-retired lawyers to remain with
the firm as inactive partners, receiving income from the firm. I recognize that
these retired lawyers, even without formal managerial authority, may exert
some informal influence on the firm. In view of their prior service with the firm,
I would find this influence quite appropriate.
45. The owners clearly incur vicarious civil liabilty for conduct of the firm's personnel under traditional
theories of tort law. In addition, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct require every partner in a law firm to
"make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all law-
yers in the firm conform to the rules of professional conduct." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
5.1(a) (1983).
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On the other hand, my proposal would not allow a lawyer to retain an
ownership interest in a firm if the lawyer leaves that firm in order to practice as
a partner in another firm. It is inappropriate, in my view, for a lawyer to retain
an ownership interest in two firms while practicing in only one of them. I recog-
nize, however, that this aspect of my proposal may require reconsideration and
revision in light of further study and comments.
C. The Firm Requires Its Lawyers to Exercise Independent Professional
Judgment (or, if the Firm Consists of One Lawyer, that Person Exercises Inde-
pendent Professional Judgment)
A law firm that practices law only and is owned exclusively by lawyers
engaged actively in the firm's practice shows great promise of independence, but
these two vital attributes are not enough to guarantee the firm's full indepen-
dence. In addition, the firm should allow and require all of its lawyers to exer-
cise their independent professional judgment.
If the law firm consists of only one lawyer, this simply requires that person
to exercise independent professional judgment.4" The matter is more compli-
cated in larger law firms. In these settings, the partner who maintains top-level
contact with the client should exercise independent professional judgment on
behalf of the law firm, giving the objective advice and vigorous representation
discussed earlier in this Essay. In addition, the firm, as a matter of policy,
should allow and require lawyers who assist this partner to exercise their own
independent professional judgment and to express any concerns to the partner.
If these concerns are not resolved between the assisting lawyer and the partner,
the matter should be referred to other members of the firm and, if necessary, to
outside consultants and even to appropriate committees of the bar.47
I acknowledge that a law firm may face close questions of proper profes-
sional conduct, that reasonable and conscientious lawyers may disagree, and
that someone must in the end be able to speak for the firm when advising and
representing a client. I suggest, however, that assisting lawyers should be al-
lowed and required to express their concerns in the manner suggested above.
My proposal on this matter raises issues that may arise, not only as attrib-
utes of law firm independence, but also in civil litigation or in lawyer discipli-
nary proceedings. If a lawyer brings a civil suit against a law firm and demon-
strates that the firm discharged or otherwise penalized the lawyer for expressing
concerns regarding an issue of professional judgment, the court should award
relief to the lawyer in accordance with the public policy exception to the em-
ployment at will doctrine.48 Young lawyers especially need this type of protec-
tion at the present time, when most of them graduate from law school owing
tens of thousands of dollars in tuition loans. The burden of repaying this debt
places significant pressure upon lawyers at the beginning of their careers. If a
46. This accords with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980). A similar result is
implied by MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 2.1 (1983).
47. See Levinson, Young Lawyer, supra note 1; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 com-
ment t 2 (1983).
48. See supra note 10.
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young lawyer faces this debt burden as well as the risk of discharge at the
employer's will without any judicial remedy grounded in public policy, the law-
yer may have great difficulty in complying with professional standards, although
the rules clearly require compliance without regard to personal financial
concerns.
In the area of professional discipline, Rule 5.2(b) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct addresses a related issue in the following language: "A
subordinate lawyer does not violate the rules of professional conduct if that law-
yer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an
arguable question of professional duty."49 Clearly this Rule does not protect a
subordinate lawyer from sanctions for committing a clear violation of the rules.
The Rule leaves some ambiguity, however, as to how much leeway is available
to the subordinate lawyer to plead the defense of "superior orders" to discipli-
nary charges.
The courts and disciplinary boards should excuse subordinate lawyers
under Rule 5.2(b) only in the narrowest range of situations and then only if the
subordinate made conscientious efforts to ascertain that the supervising lawyer's
resolution of the matter was indeed "reasonable." This proposed interpretation
would impose the maximum responsibility upon the subordinate lawyer, and
would therefore confirm that lawyer's right and obligation to exercise indepen-
dent professional judgment and to express concerns under appropriate
circumstances.
Under my proposed attributes, then, the law firm should not penalize an
assisting lawyer for raising concerns regarding matters of independent profes-
sional judgment; to the contrary, a lawyer should face criticism within the firm
for failing to raise concerns in appropriate situations. The firm liberally should
allow assisting lawyers to opt out of working on matters that give them a sense
of discomfort. If, however, a lawyer constantly opts out of matters, the lawyer
and the firm should face the possibility that their relationship is incompatible.
The approach suggested here is practical. Some law firms, perhaps a ma-
jority, already have policies of this type. Without such a policy, a firm is not
fully independent because its managing partners lack the input from other law-
yers that is essential to assure the independence of the law firm itself.
Although I suggest that fully independent firms comply with this attribute
in its entirety, I recognize that other firms may prefer not to. All law firms,
however, should at least comply with a minimal version of this attribute and
should allow, even if they do not require, their lawyers to express concerns on
matters of professional conduct.
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.2(b) (1983). The Code does not contain any similar
provision. See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note 41, at 881-83; Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates,
26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 259 (1985); Levinson, Young Lawyer, supra note 1.
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D. The Firm Does Not Have any Significant Financial Involvement with Any
of Its Clients Other than Cost Reimbursements and Fees Payable in Money
This attribute requires the law firm to avoid any significant financial in-
volvement with any of its clients other than cost reimbursements and fees paya-
ble in money. This means, for example, that no lawyer in the firm should be an
officer or a member of the board of directors of any client corporation; be sub-
stantially involved with any client as owner, creditor, debtor, employee or con-
tractor; be named as a client's executor, trustee, guardian, or attorney in fact;
or serve in any other capacity than as an attorney at law.
In applying this standard, related parties should be treated as one; for ex-
ample, the spouse of a lawyer in the firm should not be an employee or a sub-
stantial investor in a subsidiary of any of the firm's client corporations. This
may seem extreme, but I propose it as the best way to assure the objectivity of
the firm and all of its lawyers.
The law firm should establish fee arrangements in terms of money unless
the firm renders its services without charge. The firm should not take a fee from
any client in any nonmonetary form such as a "piece of the action." As regards
reimbursements for costs, the firm should make clear arrangements with the
client in advance and these reimbursements should be payable only in cash.
A law firm would not qualify under this attribute by being independent as
to one client but not as to another. Nor would the firm qualify by establishing a
"Chinese wall" to screen any individual lawyer from contact with a matter in
which that lawyer was financially involved. 50 For reasons discussed later, this
attribute requires the firm and all of its lawyers to maintain full independence
as to all clients. The next attribute reinforces this independence by preventing
the firm from relying on any one client for a major percentage of its fees.
Why should a law firm be independent of all or even any of its own clients?
The law firm, after all, is neither an independent auditor5 nor a judge, but
rather is a confidential advisor and is sometimes called upon to serve as a repre-
sentative and an advocate. Why should the law firm and its members not have a
financial stake in the client if that is what the firm and the client want?
A law firm that is not financially independent of its clients loses part of its
claim to objectivity and credibility. The law firm can too easily fall under the
influence of clients or become embroiled in the internal management of cli-
ents.52 For example, a law firm's advice to a corporation on a pending corporate
50. Some courts allow a law firm to escape disqualification if it establishes a "Chinese wall," that is, an
honor system to screen an individual lawyer from others in the firm, when the individual is considered to be
tainted by grounds that could require his or her disqualification from a particular matter. See, e.g., Manning v.
Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir.
1983); Tenn. Bd. Prof. Resp. Formal Ethics Op. 89-F- 118 (1989) (approving use of screening procedures to allow
a law firm to escape disqualification, whether the disqualified individual comes from governmental or private
practice, and whether that person is a lawyer, law clerk, paralegal, or legal secretary).
51. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984) (distinction between roles of
lawyer and independent auditor, in context of IRS access to client information in hands of professional); 17
C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (1989) (SEC requirement on qualifications of independent auditor).
52. See generally Curzan & Pelesh, The Changing Role of Outside Counsel: A Proposal for a Legal "Au-
dit," 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 838 (1981); Gruenbaum & Oppenheimer, Special Investigative Counsel: Conflicts
and Roles, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 865 (1981); Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public Interest.
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takeover or a proposed bankruptcy filing may be affected by the firm's self-
interest if the firm or its members have significant financial stakes other than a
monetary fee for their legal services. As another example, a lawyer who drafts a
will for a client that names the lawyer as executor may be motivated by the
prospect of receiving fees as executor rather than by a desire to recommend the
most appropriate person to serve as executor.
Lawyers who serve as officers or directors of their corporate clients cause
numerous difficulties and uncertainties. Other board members may not know if
the lawyer-director is speaking as lawyer or as director; the lawyer-director may
be called as a material witness to matters in which that person participated as a
director, and may consequently be disqualified from continuing to serve as a
lawyer;63 in corporate takeover situations, the loyalties of the lawyer-director
may be divided between the old management and the corporation which may
benefit from a change in management. The lawyer-director may also deprive the
corporation of participation in a free market for legal services by depriving
other law firms of fair access to the opportunity to render legal services to those
clients. And as a practical matter, the law firm itself incurs a high level of
exposure to disqualification from litigation, discharge by the client, and civil
liability arising from its members' involvement in the business of the client.54
Noncash fees offer certain advantages to the client by making services
available to clients with limited cash flow and symbolizing the law firm's partic-
ipation in the client's risks. I concede that in some settings, informed clients
may prefer to arrange a noncash fee to one payable in cash. Some law firms
may quite appropriately offer this type of arrangement, although it impairs
their independence, so long as clients wishing to enter into arrangements for
cash fees have access to an adequate number of independent law firms that
limit themselves to arrangements for cash fees.
The fee in the form of a "piece of the action" impairs the law firm's inde-
pendence for three reasons. First, the lawyer may have a much better under-
standing than the client regarding the value of the nonmonetary fee in relation
to the legal services rendered. As a result, this fee arrangement may allow the
lawyer to take unfair advantage of the client and the desire to enter into such
an arrangement may prevent the lawyer from giving the client objective advice.
Second, upon receiving the nonmonetary fee, the lawyer is likely to become the
client's partner or co-owner of the property. This relationship impairs the law-
yer's independence in rendering any future legal services to the same client.
Third, if a law firm receives noncash fees from its clients, the firm must create a
holding company or establish some other means of managing its noncash assets.
The need to manage these assets and the need to account for them when calcu-
lating how to distribute the law firm's revenues among the partners must create
and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REv. 423 (1978); Symposium on the Law Firm as a Societal Institution, 37
STAN. L. REv. 271 (1985); Symposium: The Role of Counsel in Corporate Acquisitions and Takeovers: Conflicts
and Complications, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 573 (1988).
53. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY DR 5-101(B) (1980).
54. See 2 FL MALLEN & J. S ITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 20.11-12 (1989).
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serious distractions from the law firm's primary mission and may render the law
firm dependent on nonlawyer financial managers.
If law firms generally are financially involved in the business of their cli-
ents, society may perceive the law firms in the same way as if the law firms
were engaged in a nonlaw business-as abusing their privilege to practice and
making unfair use of the inside information they obtain from clients. In addi-
tion, society may resent the tendency of law firms to "muscle in" on the busi-
ness of their clients.
Why should this attribute apply to the law firm's relationship with all cli-
ents? Why not allow a law firm to be financially involved with one client or
arrange for a nonmonetary fee with one client and still claim to be independent
as to all other clients? The reason is that this Essay proposes that some firms
should qualify as independent law firms by conducting their entire practices in
accordance with a set of attributes designed to assure a high level of indepen-
dence. The identification of a firm as independent will have an impact on the
firm's ability to attract clients, to recruit personnel, to function in the profes-
sion, and to operate in other ways discussed in the last part of the Essay. The
firm is likely to adopt a distinctive style of practice management, suited to its
status and self-image as an independent law firm.
I realize that the attribute now under consideration may be the most troub-
lesome of all my proposals. In case its implementation appears too difficult, I
offer three fall-back proposals. The first would allow the firm to represent a
client even though a lawyer in the firm is financially involved with the client
provided the lawyer is screened from participating in the matter by a "Chinese
wall."' 5 The second would allow the law firm to depart from the requirements
of this attribute with the prior consent of an independent and authoritative per-
son such as a disinterested judge (although I appreciate the possibility that law
firms may engage in forum shopping in the hope of finding someone who will
give perfunctory approval). The final option is to allow a law firm to be finan-
cially involved with its own clients, but to require disclosure of this involvement
in all communications likely to be relied upon by third parties; this last position
conforms approximately to the current rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.56
E. The Firm Does Not Expect to Receive a Major Percentage of Its Fees
from Any Ohe Client
My final proposed attribute is that the law firm should not expect to re-
ceive a major percentage of its fees from any one client. I recognize the diffi-
culty of defining what constitutes a "major" percentage. Perhaps a professional
organization could develop guidelines, or perhaps it would suffice to regard a fee
as "major" if the risk of its loss would be reasonably likely to impair the objec-
tivity and independence of the law firm.
55. See supra note 50.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 229.509 (1989) (SEC requirement that lawyer disclose interest in corporation).
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If a law firm has only one client, the firm is in substantially the same posi-
tion as house counsel employed by the client. The firm may not lose its indepen-
dence entirely but the firm lacks the full measure of objectivity and credibility
of a completely independent firm.
For similar reasons, a law firm cannot be completely independent if one
client produces a major percentage of the firm's revenue from fees. The inde-
pendent law firm should therefore have a broad enough base of clients to pre-
vent the firm's reliance on any one client for a major percentage of its fees. At
some stages of a law firm's development, this may be a difficult goal to achieve.
A firm should be regarded as independent if it is making reasonable efforts to
reach this position.
III. How TO ASSURE THE EXISTENCE OF AN ADEQUATE NUMBER AND
VARIETY OF INDEPENDENT LAW FIRMS
The legal profession should take steps to assure the continued existence of
an adequate number and variety of independent law firms so that every client
wishing to retain such a firm has an opportunity to do so. We cannot respon-
sibly leave the future of this type of firm to chance because the risk to society is
too high.
Enforceable rules already require law firms to be independent to some ex-
tent; for example, the ABA rule prohibits law firms from admitting nonlawyers
to partnership, and even the new D.C. rule places significant limits on nonlaw-
yer partners.57 I support the existing rules protecting law firm independence and
I would not object to the adoption of additional rules, for example, to limit the
rendition of nonlaw services by law firms.58 I do not, however, advocate adop-
tion of rules to impose all of my proposed attributes of independence upon all
law firms because I am not convinced that society needs all firms to possess all
of these attributes. Instead, we should first establish and publicize standards of
law firm independence, and then give the informed market an opportunity to
operate in conjunction with appropriate regulatory action.
A. Responsibility of the Legal Profession
Members of the legal profession practice in various settings, but have some
important features in common-virtually the same type of education, license,
and basic professional standards. Our general-purpose bar associations offer us
opportunities to deal collectively with matters of general concern to the profes-
sion and to society. Our advisory role in judicial selection and in the public
forum reinforces our unity rather than our diversity. We have displayed profes-
sion-wide solidarity in the past in our support of legal services for the indigent,
civil rights, and other matters of social concern.59 We should give the same type
of support to assuring the future of the independent law firm.
57. Supra notes 2, 31-44.
58. See, e.g., the recommendation recently adopted by the ABA Section of Litigation, supra note 24.
59. The Preambles to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility emphasize the collective responsibility of lawyers to improve the legal system and the administration
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All lawyers have a part to play in establishing and publicizing the stan-
dards of the independent law firm. Once a set of standards has been adopted,
each law firm should seriously consider the standards and determine whether or
not to adopt these standards and identify itself as independent. Firms that iden-
tify themselves as independent law firms should cooperate with firms that do
not, for example, by referring clients to an appropriate type of firm and remain-
ing open to lateral hiring of lawyers from the other type of practice. While the
standards are being drafted, and during any period when their adoption is vol-
untary, firms should refrain from taking any significant moves away from inde-
pendence if the primary motivation is to achieve a grandfathered exemption
from potential new rules.
House counsel have a special opportunity and responsibility. They perform
a vital function in advising corporate management when to retain outside law
firms and in recommending the specific firms.60 House counsel should make sure
corporate management understands the advantages and disadvantages of retain-
ing independent law firms and should advise management conscientiously which
type of firm is preferable in a given situation. Judges should remain informed
about the efforts of the legal profession to define the independent law firm and
give serious consideration to any proposed rules designed to preserve the inde-
pendent firm by regulation.
B. Establishing and Publicizing the Standards of Independence
In order to make the proposals workable, the legal profession needs an au-
thoritative definition of "independent law firm." One approach would be to ob-
tain a pronouncement, such as an ABA ethics opinion, ABA resolution, court
decision, court rule, or FTC regulation, declaring that terms such as "law firm,"
"attorneys at law," and "counselors at law," are misleading unless they refer to
a firm that possesses the five attributes discussed in this Essay. A pronounce-
ment to this effect might conform quite closely to the meaning of these terms in
the mind of the average reasonable person. If, then, these terms can be properly
applied only to an independent law firm, other types of firms must use other
terms to identify themselves. For example, a nonindependent firm might be re-
quired to identify itself as "a firm of lawyers, accountants, and economists," or
''a firm of lawyers that offer legal services and business advice in exchange for
equity interests in their clients' business or property."
If no authoritative pronouncement defines terms such as "law firm" and
limits their use to mean only independent firms, the legal profession should find
another way to establish a standard description of such firms. This could be
achieved, for example, by creation of a special organization, conceivably a sec-
tion of the ABA or even a completely new organization. It should provide the
principal forum for discussing and ultimately adopting standards of indepen-
of justice. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1980).
60. See MacDonald, Speculations by a Customer About the Future of Large Law Firms, 64 IND. LJ. 593
(1989).
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dence. Then the organization should prepare and publicize an explanation of
these standards. Any law firm seeking membership in the organization should
undertake to conform to those standards. By identifying itself as a member of
the organization, a law firm will hold itself out to the profession and to the
public as subscribing to those standards.
Perhaps the most difficult task of the organization-or of the leadership of
the profession-will be to determine whether to depend entirely on voluntary
compliance in the first instance, or to propose some immediate regulatory mea-
sures to protect independent law firms in case the market fails to do so.
C. The Market
Many clients and third-party consumers of legal services may find the con-
cept of the independent law firm quite attractive. For example, clients may be
greatly relieved to find law firms willing to render legal services without de-
manding a "piece of the action" in the clients' business or property, investors
may insist on receiving opinion letters from independent law firms, and clients
and third parties located in other countries may find the independent law firm
especially attractive if it happens to approximate the role of lawyers in their
own countries. 1
So long as independent and nonindependent types of practice coexist, both
types will compete in recruiting and retaining individual lawyers. By "voting
with their feet," individual lawyers will significantly affect the supply side of the
market's response to the independent law firm. In another area of the market,
insurance companies offering professional liability coverage may conclude that
independent law firms pose a different type of risk and should therefore pay
different premiums than other firms.
The market may, however, display selectivity in its support of the indepen-
dent law firm. Large corporate clients may take one approach while individual
and small business clients may take another. If the market does not voluntarily
support and adequate number and variety of independent law firms in all major
types of practice, serving all types of clientele, regulatory intervention will be
appropriate.
D. Regulation if Necessary
The organization or the leadership of the profession may seek some degree
of regulation at the very beginning, with later escalation if necessary, or may
withhold any regulation during an experimental period of voluntary compliance.
Some readers, no doubt, will object to regulation as a means of preserving an
institution that cannot survive in a free and informed market. I have my own
concerns along the same lines, but I would support regulation as a last resort in
this situation because of the various ways in which the independent law firm can
make essential contributions to the public interest, as discussed throughout this
Essay.
61. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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Some aspects of law firm independence are already incorporated into rules
of professional conduct.62 One approach is to expand and strengthen these rules,
so as to require all lawyers to conform to additional standards of independence.
The resolution recently adopted by the ABA Section of Litigation takes this
approach by proposing new rules to place limits on the ancillary business activi-
ties of law firms. 63
The organization or leadership of the profession could pursue another regu-
latory solution by promulgating an authoritative definition of the independent
law firm. Next, regulations could give independent law firms an exclusive mar-
ket for certain types of practice. For example, a state or federal agency ad-
ministering securities or tax laws could require parties to submit certain docu-
ments bearing the signature of an independent law firm, or a court could limit
certain types of litigation practice to attorneys associated with independent
firms.
Finally, regulations could provide benefits to independent law firms as in-
centives or rewards for engaging in this type of practice. The rationale is that
independent law firms, by choosing that status, demonstrate a special commit-
ment to the public interest and may therefore receive preferential treatment.
IV. OTHER PROFESSIONS AND OTHER COUNTRIES
The legal profession in the United States is not alone in facing the issues
discussed here. Remarkably similar issues confront other professions in this
country, as well as the legal profession in other countries. This part of the Essay
comments, as examples, on the public accounting profession in the United
States and on the legal profession in Europe, and suggests how law firms in the
United States should react to current developments in other professions and
other countries.
A. The Public Accounting Profession in the United States
A committee report recently distributed for comment by the Florida Board
of Accountancy illustrates the concerns facing the public accounting profession
in the United States today.64 The report first discusses "scope of services," an
issue virtually identical to the issue of law firms "branching out" into areas
beyond their primary field of expertise. In the case of public accounting firms,
the primary field is the "attest" function of rendering audit reports on the finan-
cial statements of clients. Public accounting firms have steadily expanded the
scope of their services far beyond this function, with the result that major public
62. Supra notes 12-17.
63. Supra note 24.
64. AD Hoc COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE STRUCTURE OF CPA FIRMS, STRUCTURE OF CPA FIRMS: A RE-
PORT FOR THE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION. STATE OF
FLORIDA (Sept. 13, 1989) (distributed for comment by the Board of Accountancy).
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accounting firms derive significant revenues from tax services and a wide range
of activities loosely described as management advisory services. 65
The Committee reviewed reports prepared within the past few years by
various nationwide study groups in response to concerns that expansion of
nonattest functions may tend to impair the independent performance of the at-
test function. The Committee concluded that none of the prior studies presented
evidence of such impairment; consequently the Committee did not propose to
curtail the exercise of nonattest functions by public accounting firms.
Having reached this conclusion, the Committee addressed its other major
issue-whether public accounting firms should be allowed to admit non-CPAs
as partners. At present, statutes prohibit non-CPAs from becoming partners.
The Committee recommended a statutory amendment that would allow non-
CPAs to become partners subject to certain limitations.66
I object to the Committee's recommendations for reasons resembling those
set forth in this Essay regarding similar issues in the legal profession. In addi-
tion, I would reformulate the Committee's question about the results of the re-
cent expansion of nonattest functions. Instead of asking whether the expansion
of these services has impaired the independence of the audit function, I would
ask whether there is a reasonable probability that the expansion of nonattest
services is linked with the increase in reported cases of audit failure. In response
to this question, I perceive a significant connection, especially during the past
two decades. 67 In my opinion, the independence of the public accounting profes-
sion in performing its primary mission-the attest function-has indeed been
seriously compromised by the expansion of nonattest services. I propose a cur-
tailment of nonattest services by public accounting firms and favor the contin-
ued exclusion of non-CPAs from partnership in public accounting firms. In
short, I propose that public accounting firms should concentrate on rendering
audit services just as law firms should concentrate on rendering legal services.
65. The Committee reports that public accounting firms render the following types of services: Actuarial
services, executive recruiting, marketing consulting, plant layout, telecommunications planning, strategic planning
services, information technology planning and implementation, systems development, human resource consulting,
manufacturing productivity consulting, merger and acquisition services, valuation and appraisal services, and edu-
cational services. The Committee also notes that public accounting firms are involved in marketing proprietary
products such as computer software. Id. at 6.
66. The Committee proposes to attach the following limitations to the admission of non-CPA partners to
public accounting firms: (I) The non-CPA must be active in the practice of the firm; (2) the non-CPA must state
to clients and potential clients that he is not a CPA; (3) the non-CPA must not have direct supervisory authority
for the business and practice of any office of the CPA firm; (4) the non-CPA must comply with requirements
promulgated by the State Board of Accountancy regarding registration, qualifications, and continuing education;
(5) the non-CPA must not perform or directly supervise audits, reviews or compilations of financial statements;
(6) the non-CPA must not perform or directly supervise tax advisory, tax compliance or personal financial plan-
ning services unless the non-CPA is a member of the bar of any state; and (7) the total number of non-CPA
partners must be less than a majority of all partners (or no more than one-third of all partners if the total number
of partners is 25 or fewer). Id., app. at 1-5 (draft statute attached as appendix to report).
67. See. e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-89-38. REPORT ON CPA AUDIT QUALITY
(1989); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFc. GAO/AFMD-89-45. REPORT ON CPA AUDITS OF SAVINGS AND LOANS
(1989); Note, The Big Eight, Management Consulting and Independence: Myth or Reality?, 61 S. CAL L. REv.
1511 (1988). Cf. Leinicke & Fish, A Different Approach to Serving Clients, J. ACCT., Jan. 1990, at 53; Mednick,
Independence: Let's Get Back to Basics, J. Accr., Jan. 1990, at 86.
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The continued expansion of the scope of services offered by public account-
ing firms has become a matter of concern to some members of the legal profes-
sion. A recent report in the ABA Journal on law firm diversification attributes
the following opinion to a principal of a prominent firm that consults on the
management of law firms: "[By branching out into nonlegal areas] .. . the
legal profession only will be doing what is already practiced by, for example,
accounting firms that do tax law and banks that engage in estate planning.
'Lawyers aren't going to let themselves be left out much longer'. ..,
At one time the legal profession and organizations representing other pro-
fessions used to enter into "treaties" that tended to place limits on encroach-
ment by one profession upon the domain of another.6 9 No doubt these treaties
would raise serious questions under today's antitrust laws as well as under cur-
rent notions of deregulation and free competition. The treaties probably served
a valuable purpose and I doubt their abolition has helped society or any clients.
In today's political climate, however, I do not propose to reinstate the treaties.
Instead, along the lines discussed earlier in this Essay, I propose require-
ments that would compel all law firms and all public accounting firms to dis-
close publicly whether their practices are law firms limited to the rendition of
legal services; public accounting firms limited to the performance of the attest
function; or firms which fit neither of the above categories, in which case the
firms should clearly identify the nature of their practices. At the same time, the
ABA and its counterpart, the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants, should publish explanations of such terms as "law firm" and "public ac-
counting firm," together with discussions of the advantages and disadvantages
associated with firms that concentrate their practices on legal services or audit
services.
If the marketplace does not respond by favoring the independent law firm
and the independent public accounting firm, I propose regulatory solutions in
the public interest. If regulatory solutions are adopted, no doubt someone will
object and litigate on antitrust grounds. The ultimate remedy will then lie with
Congress and the courts.
B. The Legal Profession in Europe
The roots of the legal profession in Europe go back centuries before the
Europeans discovered North America. Europeans are now having to reconsider
many of the traditions of their separate countries in light of the extensive moves
toward European economic integration by the end of 1992. One aspect of inte-
gration is the possible creation of multinational law practices. This development
conforms to the general principles of integration within the European Commu-
nity. Its implementation, however, will require changes to the existing profes-
sional rules so as to allow lawyers to combine with colleagues from other Com-
munity countries either in the form of partnerships or in looser types of
68. Gibbons, supra note 4, at 68, 73.
69. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 41, at 824.
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associations such as European Economic Integration Groups (EEIGs).7° In or-
der to pave the way for developments along these lines, the Council of European
Bar Associations has established a working group and adopted a Common Code
of Conduct."'
The multinational practice is not the only proposed innovation. Europeans
are also discussing the possibility of allowing the creation of multidisciplinary
practices (MDPs) which would offer nonlegal as well as legal services and per-
mit nonlawyers as well as lawyers to be partners. Pending bills in the United
Kingdom Parliament would deregulate this aspect of the practice of law and
allow the legal profession to adopt its own rules that could permit the creation
of MDPs as well as multinational practices.72 Opinion in the United Kingdom is
sharply divided on this issue. One of the objections to allowing MDPs in the
United Kingdom is that other European countries may find MDPs unacceptable
and therefore regard such firms as ineligible for inclusion in multinational law
practices.73
Many law firms in the United States have already established offices in
Europe as well as other overseas locations. American firms are likely to take an
increasing interest in Europe as integration comes closer to reality. In a recent
discussion with the ABA Journal, the managing partner of the London office of
a major U.S. firm predicted full-scale mergers between American and British
law firms within the next two to five years. His explanation is quite frank: "A
big part of the reason .. .is the increasing competition among law firms at
home, the saturation of legal services and the growing problems of conflict of
interest. . . .American firms need new clients, and they can find them in
Europe. '74
The legal professions in the United States and in Europe face serious un-
certainties about the future of multidisciplinary practice as well as other issues,
such as those explored in this Essay. It seems most appropriate that the profes-
sion in each continent should resolve its own identity crisis before any firms
establish intercontinental partnerships or other relationships of long term associ-
ation. Even after some of the existing problems have been resolved in each con-
tinent, some basic incompatibilities among legal systems and legal professions
will present serious obstacles to multinational partnerships. For example, Euro-
70. On EEIGs, see generally Cross-Border Mergers of Public Limited Companies, I Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1 1441.01 (1988); On the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
1%1451-52t (1988).
71. Supra note 9. The CCBE Code is similar, in some respects, to the International Bar Association Inter-
national Code of Ethics, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL CODE OF ETHICS (1988 ed.).
On developments in Europe, see generally DeVries, The International Legal Profession-The Fundamental
Right of Association, 21 INT'L LAW. 845 (1987); The Legal Profession and Legal Services, 14 INT'L LEG. PRACT.
34 (1989); Willig, Why We Need Foreign Legal Consultants in Florida, FLA. BJ., Feb. 1990, at 23.
72. Courts and Legal Services Bill [H.L.], cl. 48 (1989); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scot-
land) Bill [H.L.], cl. 23 (1989). See also Carlisle, English White Paper Law Reforms: An Outline for Equal
Access to Justice?, N.Y. ST. BJ., Jan. 1990, at 54; Flood, Megalaw in the U.K.: Professionalism or Corporatism?
A Preliminary Report, 64 IND. L.J. 569 (1989).
73. See LAW SOCIETY OF SCOTLAND, PUBLIC PROTECTION: PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE 57 (1989) (re-
spnse of the Council of the Law Society of Scotland to the Scottish Home and Health Department's consultation
paper, "The Legal Profession in Scotland").
74. Harper, Going Global: Big Law Firms Expand Overseas, A.B.A.J., Sept. 1989, at 68, 70.
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pean traditions include, to one extent or another, separation between the prac-
tices of barristers and solicitors, prohibition of contingent fee arrangements, and
immunity of barristers from civil liability. In addition, European and American
lawyers have different systems of legal education, apprenticeship, career tracks,
career mobility, and judicial selection.
It seems premature at this time for American law firms to intervene in the
European Community's resolution of its own problems. Even if our firms have
the opportunity to establish preliminary relationships with European firms, we
should exercise restraint lest we burden our European colleagues by exporting
our own problems. Further, any serious involvement by American law firms in
European law practice, in its present unsettled state, would oblige us to consider
the Europeans as another of our constituencies while we are trying to solve our
own problems, and to that extent would add a new complication tending to
impede our exercise of independence.
V. CONCLUSION
The powerful forces advocating deregulation and free competition may
tempt us to think we are at liberty to seize whatever business opportunities
come our way. Much as we may wish to be free, however, we are not. We are
burdened by duties to society as the inevitable price of accepting the awesome
privilege of practicing law. These duties require us, for reasons stated in this
Essay, to give every client the opportunity to retain an independent law firm.
We should be seriously concerned about the pending proposals by some
lawyers and accountants in this country, and by the advocates of multidiscipli-
nary practices in Europe, to dilute or even abandon professional independence.
We should not, however, conclude that theirs is necessarily the wave of the
future. To the contrary, I hope and believe there is a bright future for indepen-
dent law firms and for independent firms in other professions that practice ex-
clusively in their respective fields of expertise, such as auditing. The multidis-
ciplinary firm, on the other hand, faces a series of problems, many of them
flowing from the risk that the firm may not have a distinctive professional
identity.
With the passage of time, the recent emergence of multidisciplinary firms
in this country and the pending proposals for similar types of practice in Europe
may look like aberrations in the history of the professions. Each profession, by
reaffirming its own distinctiveness and independence, may contribute to renewed
pride and satisfaction in the practice of each and best serve the interests of
society.
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